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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder in the
second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-203,
both first degree felonies.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section

78-2-2(3)(i), jurisdiction is proper in this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Is subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-3521.5 arbitrary, capricious, and violative of Article I, section
VII of the Utah Constitution?
2. Did the trial court err in sentencing Appellant to
the Utah State Prison?
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah
Section 7. [Due Process of Law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. section 62A-12-204 (1988 Cumulative Supplement,
replacement volume 7A, Part I):
(2) The state hospital is authorized to
receive from any other institution within the
department any person committed to that
institution, when a careful evaluation of the
treatment needs of that person and of the
treatment programs available at the state
hospital indicates that the transfer would be
in the interest of that person.
(3) The state hospital is required to
receive any person committed to the state
prison when ordered by the executive director
of the department. In making that
determination, the executive director shall
consider the treatment needs of that person
and the treatment programs available at the
state hospital. Any person so transferred to
the state hospital shall remain under the
jurisdiction of the state prison or such
other institution, and the state hospital
shall act solely as the agent of the state
iv.

prison or such other institution.
Utah Code Ann. section 64-7-36(10) (Volume 7A, Part II, 1986
replacement volume):
(10) The court shall order hospitalization
if, upon completion of the hearing and
consideration of the record, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The proposed patient has a mental
illness; and
(b) Because of the patient's illness the
proposed patient poses an immediate danger of
physical injury to others or self, which may
include the inability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food, clothing,
and shelter, if allowed to remain at liberty;
and
(c) The patient lacks the ability to
engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to
weigh the possible costs and benefits of
treatment; and
(d) There is no appropriate less
restrictive alternative to a court order of
hospitalization; and
(e) The hospital or mental health
facility in which the individual is to be
hospitalized pursuant to this act can provide
the individual with treatment that is
adequate and appropriate to the individual's
conditions and needs....
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 (replacement voliome 8B, 1988
cumulative supplement):
....

(4) "Mental illness" means a mental
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a
congenital condition or one the result of
injury or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease. Mental illness does not mean
a personality or character disorder or
abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5 (replacement volume 8C, 1988
cumulative supplement):
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally
ill being tendered by a defendant to any
charge, the court shall hold a hearing within
a reasonable time to determine the claim of
mental illness of the defendant. Mental
v.

illness, for this purpose, is determined by
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2305(4). The court may order the defendant to
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or
any other suitable facility, and may receive
the evidence of any private or public expert
witness whose evidence is offered by the
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who
tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally ill"
shall be examined first by the trial judge in
compliance with the standards for taking
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be
advised that a plea of guilty and mentally
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent
plea. If the defendant is later found not to
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise
lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty
and the defendant shall be sentenced as any
other offender. If the court concludes that
the defendant is currently mentally ill,
applying the standards set forth in this
section, the defendant's plea shall be
accepted and he shall be sentenced as a
mentally ill offender. Expenses of
examination, observation, or treatment,
excluding travel to and from any mental
health facility, shall be charged to the
county, except when the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay part of all of
the expense where the Legislature has
expressly appropriated money for this
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to
the county in which prosecution is
commenced. Examination of defendants charged
with municipal or county ordinance violations
shall be charged to the municipality or
county commencing the prosecution.
....

(3) If the defendant is found guilty and
mentally ill, the court shall impose any
sentence which could be imposed under law
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall
conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's present mental status.
(4) The court shall in its sentence
order hospitalization at the Utah State
Hospital or other suitable facility if, upon
completion of the hearing and consideration
of the record, the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) the defendant has a mental
illness as defined by Subsection
76-2-305(4);
vi.

(b) because of his mental
illness the defendant poses an
immediate physical danger to others
or self/ which may include
jeopardizing his own or others1
safety, health, or welfare if
placed in a correctional or
probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation;
(c) the defendant lacks the
ability to engage in a rational
decision-making process regarding
the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of
inability to weigh the possible
costs and benefits of treatment;
(d) there is no appropriate
treatment alternative to a court
order of hospitalization; and
(e) the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility can provide
the defendant with treatment, care,
and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's
conditions and needs.
•• • •

(8) When the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility proposes to discharge
a defendant prior to the expiration of
sentence, the institution shall transmit to
the Board of Pardons a report on the
condition of the defendant, including the
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of
treatment, the prognosis for the remission of
symptoms, the potential for recidivism and
for the danger to himself and the public, and
the recommendations for future treatment.
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the
defendant serve any or all of the unexpired
term of the sentence at the Utah State
Prison, or place the defendant on parole. If
the Board of Pardon's pursuant to law or
administrative rules, considers for parole
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty
and mentally ill, the board shall consult
with the treating facility or agency and an
additional report on the condition of the
defendant may be filed with the board.
Pending action of the board, the defendant
shall remain at the institution at which he
is hospitalized. If the defendant is placed
vii.

on parole, treatment shall, upon the
recommendation of the hospital facility, be
made a condition of parole, and failure to
continue treatment or other condition of
parole except by agreement with the
designated facility and the Board of Pardons
is a basis for initiating parole violation
hearings. The period of parole may not be
for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced
without consideration by the Board of Pardons
of a current report on the mental health
status of the offender*

viii.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 25, 1987, Appellant was charged by
information with two counts of murder in the first degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-202 (R. 23-25).

The

information was subsequently amended to charge two counts of
murder in the second degree, to which amended charges Appellant
entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23-25; 28-35).
After accepting this plea, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
serve two consecutive terms of five years to life in the Utah
State Prison (R. 60-61).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to Appellant's statement detailing his plea
of guilty and mentally ill, Appellant, while mentally ill, shot
and killed Norman Armstrong and Janet Armstrong (R. 29).
A sentencing hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section
77-35-21.5 occurred on June 14 and 15, 1988. At this hearing,
various psychiatrists and psychologists testified about
Appellant's qualifying under the prerequisites, listed in section
77-35-21.5, to sentencing to the Utah State Hospital or other
treatment facility.
The witnesses testified that Appellant is mentally
retarded

and has the mental age of a ten-year-old

child

(T.

10),

and that Appellant also suffered brain damage at the age of
eighteen, resulting in an escalation of Appellant's misbehavior
("organic personality syndrome") (T. 34-35, 55-57).

Some of the

witnesses testified that Appellant suffers from various
1

personality disorders (T. 33, fifth page of defense exhibit 1 ) .
After hearing this testimony, the court concluded that Appellant
suffers from mental retardation and several personality
disorders, which personality disorders, the court concluded, did
not qualify as "mental illnesses" under section 76-2-305(4). (R.
72 (page 2 of Appendix I ) .
The witnesses agreed that Appellant is dangerous to
others, particularly when he has access to drugs and alcohol (T.
42, 96-100).

Some of the witnesses testified that Appellant,

because of his mental illnesses, is in unique danger in the
prison setting (T. 14, 36-37, 40-41, 48, defense exhibit 3 ) .
After hearing this testimony, the court recognized that Appellant
is dangerous to others when he has access to drugs and alcohol,
and that Appellant, as a result of his mental illnesses, is in
peculiar danger at the prison (R. 65, 72-74, T.2 17). The court,
however, rather than recognizing these dangers as reasons under
section 77-35-21.5(4)(b) that Appellant should be sentenced to
the Utah State Hospital, wrote a "recommendation" to the Board of
Pardons and Paroles warning and advising them about the dangers
posed by and to Appellant (R. 65).
The witnesses' testimony was most disparate on the
issue of whether or not Appellant's mental illnesses could be
treated at the Utah State Hospital.

The doctors from the Utah

State Hospital expressed a general tendency of the Utah State
Hospital to avoid treatment of those suffering from mental
retardation (T. 96, 100-103), and because these doctors did not
2
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Subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5,
which requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that a
mentally ill criminal defendant poses an immediate physical
danger as a prerequisite to that criminal defendant's treatment
in the state hospital or other treatment facility violates
Article I, section VII of the Utah Constitution.

The rationale

underlying subsection (b), that the person subject to commitment
must pose a danger significant enough to curtail his liberty by
committing him, originated in the civil involuntary commitment
context.

Because the mentally ill criminal defendant has no

liberty interest for the statute to protect, and because the
criminal commitment statute's objectives are treatment of
criminal defendants and protection of society, there is no logic
in requiring that a mentally ill criminal defendant manifest that
he poses physical danger in order to obtain treatment in a mental
health facility.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305(4) excludes from the
definition of mental illnesses only those personality disorders,
character disorders, and abnormalities which are "manifested only
by repeated criminal conduct".

Id_.

The trial court's

interpretation of section 76-2-305(4) as excluding all
personality disorders from the definition of mental illness is
erroneous, and should be corrected by this Court.
In the event that this Court finds that subsection (b)
of section 77-35-21.5 is constitutional, there was ample
evidence, both in the testimony at the sentencing hearing and in
4
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misinterpretsti

disregard of the sentencing statute, this Court should vacate
Appellant's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance
with standards set forth in section 77-35-21*5# as clarified by
this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPLICATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 77-35-21.5(4)(b)
TO MENTALLY ILL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
VIOLATES ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) # this
Court evaluated criteria listed under Utah Code Ann. section 7735-21.5, to be considered in sentencing criminal defendants found
"guilty and mentally ill".
1
following
clear and
sentenced
facility:

This Court noted that the criteria

Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5(4) lists the
criteria which, if demonstrated by the defendant by
convincing evidence, entitle the defendant to be
to the Utah State Hospital or other appropriate
(a) the defendant has a mental illness
as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4);
(b) because of his mental illness the
defendant poses an immediate physical danger
to others or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others* safety,
health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or lacks
the ability to provide the basic necessities
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter,
if placed on probation;
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to
engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to
weigh the possible costs and benefits of
treatment;
(d) there is no appropriate treatment
alternative to a court order of
hospitalization; and
(e) the Utah State Hospital or other
6
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With reterence to :. « >j.un_ar^ commitment, the
statutory criteria serve to protect the
individual from involuntary confinement
unless the interests of the state catweigh
the individual's right to Liberty* In the
criminal commitment statute, the criteria
must serve to balance the defendant's rio; •
to treatment against society's right to
o U ^ ^ . _ LJL-.^\
.,;
J\ provide th^- defendarr.
with treatment, c.^- .„ id custody that is
adequate and appropriate * ';=:: Jefen-Ja-•
conditions and needs.
2

Section 64-7-36(10) reads as fo,
(10) The court shall order h< .
:^J
n
if, upon, completion, of the hear,: a a;
consideration of the record, the ctur :_.
by clear and convincing evidence that;
: ' The proposed patient has a mental
illneo.- >::, ip» Because of ^.- L;-iL:
::v^
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.ate danger
physical injury to others or seiff which may
include the inability *o prcvide tie basic
necessities of ijfe, s: ch as ! t-c -i, clothing,
l
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allege*, to remain at liberty
and
(c) The pat.;e.; Lacks the ability
engage in a rational decision-making process
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment
as demonstrated by evidence of inability to
weigh the possible costs -.r, benef: ts ~-f
treatment; and
(d) There i^
,„• - propriate less
restrictive alternate > *><
court order
hospitalization; and
(e) The hospital r inei.-tal health
facility in which? the individuaJ is to be
hospitalized pursuant to this act can p m \ v»
the individual with treatment that is
adequate and, appropriate • :; 'hi- individual's
condit ions and neer! ~

7

protection against a potentially dangerous
individual.
Id.
This Court found that subsections (c) and (d) of
section 77-35-21.5 are not relevant to the criminal sentencing
process, and struck those two subsections as unconstitutional.
Id. at 1271-1272.

This Court explained that subsection (c) #

which requires a finding that the person subject to involuntary
commitment is incapable of making therapeutic decisions for
himself, was created in the civil involuntary commitment statute
to insure that the State, justified only by the protective theory
of parens patriae, does not make therapeutic choices and thereby
usurp the liberty of a person who is able to make equally valid
therapeutic choices for himself.

JEd. at 1271.

This Court found

that because the criminal defendant is faced with either a
sentence of imprisonment or criminal commitment, there is no
liberty interest at stake in the sentencing, but only an interest
in treatment.

^Ici. Because this Court saw no rational reason to

deprive a criminal defendant of treatment merely because he
recognizes his need for it, this Court struck criteria (c) from
the criminal commitment statute.

Ld. at 12 72.

This Court explained that subsection (d), which
requires that there be "no appropriate treatment alternative to a
court order of hospitalization", seeks the least restrictive
alternative in accordance with the civil commitment focus on the
mentally ill person's interest in liberty,

^d.

This Court found

that the civil commitment goal of giving the best possible
8
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This Court concluded:
The means employee in subsections (c)
and (d) of section 77-35-21.5(4), however,
are unintelligible in the context of the
statute's purposes. The legislature's
intent in section 77-35-21.5 is to provide
for treatment, as opposed to imprisonment, <»[
the mentally ill offender• Not one of the
considerations i:. subsections (: • an-.-1 'd) is
relevant to the treatment rationale*
The
application of those provisions to a mentally
ill criminal defendant !s thus arbitrary and
capricious, in violation of the due process
guarantee of article I, section VII of the
Utah Constitution

Subsection (b) of section , *,jb--i,.i iciiu'i i

M M in*

(b) because of his mental
i 1 lness the defendant poses an
immediate physical danger to others
or sel f, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others'
safety, health, or welfare if
placed in a correctional or
probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, and shelter, i f placed on,
probat i on
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Thib

criterion was created to protect the liberty interests of the
person subject to civil commitment - the danger posed by that
person must be sufficiently high to justify defeating his liberty
interests by committing him to an institution.
the Law —

Developments in

Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 Harv. L.Rev.

1190, 1236 (1974).
The dangerousness criterion has no relevance in the
context of criminal sentencing, where the person seeking
treatment for mental illness has no liberty interest at stake.
Particularly because this Court has identified the "defendant's
right to treatment and society's right to protection against a
potentially dangerous individual" as the rights at issue in the
criminal commitment context, Copeland at 1271, there is no logic
in requiring a showing that a criminal defendant poses an
immediate physical danger before that defendant can be committed
to the Utah State Hospital or other treatment, facility. Cf.
Copeland at 1272 ("If neither the hospital nor any other facility
can provide 'treatment, care and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs,' placement
in such a facility may not be justified because of the additional
if, upon completion of the hearing and
consideration of the record, the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that:
• • •.

(b) Because of the patient's illness the
proposed patient poses an immediate danger of
physical injury to others or self, which may
include the inability to provide the basic
necessities of life, such as food, clothing,
and shelter, if allowed to remain at
liberty...
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finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has a mental illness; that the
defendant poses immediate physical, danger to
himself or others or is incapable of
providing the necessities of life, so that
correctional or probationary disposition
would be improper; .». and that
hospitalization will meet the defended!'s
conditions a::l "if***-* State v. D e p l o n ^ ,
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The trial court's errors are primarily related to
questions of law, which are generally not afforded deference by
this Court on review.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52.

The

standard of review of the trial court's factual findings is the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review.

State v. DePlonty, 749

P.2d 621# 627 (Utah 1987).
A. Mental Illness as Defined by Utah Code Ann, section 76-2305(4)
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 (replacement volume 8B,
1988) defines mental illness for purposes of sentencing under
section 77-35-21.5.

Section 76-2-305 states, in part:

(4) "Mental illness" means a mental
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a
congenital condition or one the result of
injury or a residual effect of a physical or
mental disease. Mental illness does not
mean a personality or character disorder or
abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal conduct.
The trial court found that Appellant was mildly to
moderately mentally retarded, and that Appellant's mental
retardation constitutes a statutory mental illness satisfying
subsection (a) of section 77-35-21.5 (R. 72). The court
recognized that Appellant has "several personality disorders and
tends to abuse drugs and alcohol", but concluded that these
latter afflictions were excluded from the definition of mental
illness provided in section 76-2-305(4) by the language "Mental
illness does not mean a personality or character disorder" (R.
72)(T.2 16-17, 21).
As will be discussed infra, the court erred in
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"or subdivision thereof" modified only the antecedent "county",
or whether it also modified the word "state".
740.

Salt Lake City at

This Court espoused a practical application of the "last

antecedent rule":
[Q]ualifying words and phrases are generally
regarded as applying to the immediately
preceding words, rather than to more remote
ones.
•• • •

When applied with [the objective of
assisting in the ascertainment of legislative
intent], it will be seen that the so called
"last antecedent rule" is not necessarily
limited to the one term immediately
preceding, but if there are several preceding
terms of the same character, it may modify
all of such terms, if the natural and
sensible meaning of the wording so requires.
E.G., a reference to horses, cattle, sheep,
or any of their young, would not mean only
the lambs of the sheep, but would mean the
young of all three classes, colts, calves and
lambs.
Id. at 740-741.
In the instant case, the terms personality disorder,
character disorder, and abnormality are synonyms, or terms "of
the same character", and it is logical to construe the phrase
"manifested only by repeated criminal acts" as qualifying all
three terms.
In

Salt Lake City, this Court also explained that "the

statute should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance
with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished."
741.

jtcl. at

Section 76-2-305(4) was enacted for the purpose of

providing appropriate legal and medical treatment for mentally
ill criminal defendants.

While there may be a rational basis for
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distinguishing between the legal and medical treatment of
criminal defendants whose sole abnormality is repeated criminal
conduct from criminal defendants with other mental illnesses,
there is no rational basis to distinguish between criminal
defendants with personality or character disorders and criminal
defendants with other mental illnesses.
This Court should correct the trial court's
misinterpretation by recognizing that under section 76-2-305(4)#
only those personality disorders, character disorders, and
abnormalities which are manifested solely by repeated criminal
conduct are excluded from the definition of mental illness.
2. Appellant suffers from numerous mental illnesses that are not
"manifested only by repeated criminal conduct".
There is ample evidence to support the court's
conclusion that Appellant is mentally retarded and thus
statutorily mentally ill - numerous physicians testified that
Appellant has the mental age of a ten-year-old (T. 28-29, 49).
There was no dispute among the witnesses at trial that mental
retardation qualifies as a mental illness under section 76-2305(4). (T. 12, 84).
Also, when Appellant was 18 years of age, he suffered a
lung disease which impeded the supply of oxygen to his brain (T.
34).

This "anoxia" apparently exacerbated Appellant's mental

retardation and began the escalation of Appellant's behavioral
problems (T. 35). Dr. Golding explained that this injury and its
behavioral consequences are diagnosed as "organic personality
syndrome" (T. 55-57).
15

There is also ample evidence to support the court's
conclusion that Appellant suffers from personality disorders.
Stephen Golding, a doctor and professor of psychology and
director of clinical training at the University of Utah,
testified that Appellant suffers from three personality
disorders: "^dependent personality disorder, schizoid personality
and antisocial personality disorder.%"

(T. 33). The clinical

director of Davis County Mental Health Center, Orin Howard
Ogilvie, M.D., concluded that Appellant suffers from a "Mixed
Personality Disorder with Antisocial and Dependent Features"
(defense exhibit 1 ) .
The fact that Appellant's personality disorders are
manifested by symptoms other than repeated criminal conduct, and
therefore could qualify as mental illnesses under section 76-2305(4) is demonstrated by reference to Dr. Golding1s detailed
description of Appellant's illnesses, which is provided in
Appendix II to thi s brief.
The trial court should have concluded that Appellant
is statutorily mentally ill because he suffers not only from
mental defects (mental retardation and organic personality
syndrome), but also from mental diseases (personality disorders
characterized by factors other than repeated criminal conduct).
Its failure to do so, resulting from its misinterpretation of the
statutory definition of mental illness, was error.
B. Immediate Physical Danger to Others or Self
Appellant stands by his argument that subsection (b) of
16

section 77-35-21.5 is unconstitutional because it cannot be
applied rationally in the context of criminal commitment of those
found guilty and mentally ill.

See Point I.

In the event that

this Court disagrees, the following discussion under subpoint B
of Point II of this brief demonstrates that there was clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant, because of his mental
illnesses, poses a physical danger to others and himself in the
prison, which evidence the court recognized in its misapplication
of the law.
The second requirement addressed by the trial court was
that embodied in subsection (b) of 77-35-21.5:
(b) because of his mental illness the
defendant poses an immediate physical danger
to others or self, which may include
jeopardizing his own or others1 safety,
health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or lacks
the ability to provide the basic necessities
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter,
if placed on probation[.]
The trial court's formal findings indicate that
Appellant's previous record of incarceration bore no proof that
Appellant had difficulties while incarcerated, and thus proved
that Appellant is not in danger in the correctional setting (R.
72).

The findings also indicate that Appellant is only dangerous

to others when he has access to drugs and alcohol (R. 72). The
court concluded that Appellant did not need to be treated at the
Utah State Hospital because Appellant would have no access to
drugs and alcohol in prison, and thus would not pose a danger to
others, and because Appellant was not in danger in the prison (R.
17

72, T.2 17).
These formal findings are illuminated by the following
"prison term recommendation":
Mr. Anderson is mildly to mildly/moderately
mentally retarded and will require special
screening for appropriate treatment and
housing. The evidence indicates that he can
become dangerous if using alcohol or drugs.
I recommend that Mr. Anderson serve a life
term on each count and not be paroled.
He should serve his term in Special Services
Dorm or similar facility deemed appropriate.
(R. 65).
As will be discussed infra, this ruling was factually
and legally erroneous for three reasons: 1) the trial court had
no evidence that Appellant would not have access to drugs and/or
alcohol in the prison, 2) as the court recognized, because of
Appellant's mental defects and illnesses, he cannot function
safely in the prison, 3) neither the sentencing statute nor any
other statute authorizes the judge to dictate the conditions of
Appellant's circumstances in the prison in an effort to mollify
the dangers posed by and to Appellant as a result of his mental
illnesses, in lieu of granting Appellant his statutory right to
treatment for his mental illnesses.
1. Appellant poses a danger, particularly because in prison, he
has access to drugs and/or alcohol.
While there is ample evidence to support the court's
finding that Appellant is physically dangerous, particularly when
he has access to drugs and alcohol (T. 42, 96-100), there is
absolutely no evidence presented to support the court's
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assumption that the court can, through a "recommendation",
prevent Appellant from having access to drugs or alcohol while
incarcerated in the prison.

Dr. Stephen Golding, in fact,

testified that such substances are readily available in the
prison (T. 41). The court's warning to the Board of Pardons and
Paroles that Appellant is dangerous when he has access to drugs
and alcohol demonstrates the court's awareness of the actual
availability of these things in the prison (R. 65).
The court's ruling pertinent to subsection (e) of
section 77-35-21.5 also demonstrates that the court recognized
Appellant as dangerous:
Further, ... the Utah State Hospital cannot
provide the secure custody necessary for the
defendant who stands convicted of two
homicides in Salt Lake County, is awaiting
sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent
Second Degree Homicide, and who tends to
abuse drugs and/or alcohol.
(R. 73-74).
2. Appellant, because of his mental illness, is in unique danger
in the prison.
In addition to the evidence that Appellant poses a
danger to others in the prison, there is clear and convincing
evidence that because of Appellant's mental retardation and
personality disorders, he is in unique danger in the prison.

In

1973, psychologist Judith Shepherd, director of the diagnostic
unit of the Utah State Prison, wrote a psychological evaluation
resulting from Appellant's ninety day stay at the Utah State
Prison (defense exhibit 2 ) . The conclusion of her psychological
evaluation was that at that time, Appellant could not function in
19

the environment of the prison:
It is believed that Mr. Anderson would
be incapable of coping with a prison
environment. He is unable to assert himself
in his own defense and is easily led, used
and abused by others as he has been observed
in his short time here.*..
(3rd page of defense exhibit 2).

Doctors Ogilvie and Golding

also expressed their opinions that Appellant, because of his
mental illnesses, cannot live safely at the prison (T. 14, 40-41,
48, page 1 of defense exhibit 3).
The court's oral ruling pertaining to subsection (c) of
77-35-21.5, which has subsequently been stricken as
unconstitutional by this Court, demonstrates that the court
indeed recognized that Appellant would be endangered by reason of
his mental illnesses if placed in the prison:
There is concern on the part of the Court
concerning you, that I would have for a
youthful offender. The State Prison does
segregate out there and they segregate sexual
offenders. They segregate youthful
offenders. They have different areas and
they certainly — they have psychologists,
they have psychiatrists, they have vocational
programs. They have the ability to help you
to cope...
(T.2 19).
Again, rather than following section 77-35-21.5, by
sentencing Appellant to the Utah State Hospital because Appellant
met the statutory criteria, the court attempted to mitigate the
degree of danger posed to Appellant in the prison by virtue of
his mental illnesses, by recommending to the Board of Pardons and
Paroles that Appellant receive special restrictions and
20

protection while in prison (R. 65).
3. The trial court's recommendation to the Board of Pardons and
Paroles is no substitute for the treatment to which Appellant is
statutorily entitled?
In submitting the recommendation to the Board of
Pardons and Paroles to house Appellant in the Special Services
Dorm and to be aware of the dangers posed by Appellant, the court
was acting "pursuant to the provisions of Section 77-18-5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 1980," (R. 65), which provided as
follows:
In cases where an indeterminate sentence
is imposed, the judge and prosecuting
attorney may, within 30 days, mail a
statement to the board of pardons setting
forth the term for which the prisoner ought
to be imprisoned together with any
information which might aid the board in
passing on the application for termination or
commutation of the sentence or for parole or
pardon.
This statute neither binds nor empowers the Board of
Pardons and Paroles to implement the trial court's
recommendations.

Rather than hoping that the prison

administration would follow the court's recommendations to
protect against the dangers posed by and to Appellant in the
prison, the court should have found that those dangers qualify
Appellant for treatment in the State Hospital or other treatment
facility under subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-3521.5.
C. Facility Providing Adequate Treatment, Care, and Custody
The last factor considered by the trial court was that
embodied in subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5:
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(e) the Utah State Hospital or
other suitable facility can provide
the defendant with treatment, care#
and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's
conditions and needs.
The trial court concluded that
the Utah State Hospital is not a suitable
facility for providing the defendant with the
treatment, care and custody that is adequate
and appropriate to the defendant's conditions
and needs, because no therapies are available
to treat the defendant's problem of
retardation which is permanent. Further, ...
the Utah State Hospital cannot provide the
secure custody necessary for the defendant
who stands convicted of two homicides in Salt
Lake County, is awaiting sentencing in Davis
County on a subsequent Second Degree
Homicide, and who tends to abuse drugs
and/or alcohol.
(R. 73-74).
This ruling is erroneous for three reasons: 1) the fact
that Appellant's mental retardation cannot be physically "cured"
does not deprive Appellant of his right to treatment, which
treatment is available at the State Hospital and Training School
and 2) the hospital is able to treat Appellant's personality
disorders, which the court erroneously failed to consider as
mental illnesses under section 76-2-305(4), 3) subsection (e)
does not, as the court believed, force the court to choose
between sentencing to the Utah State Hospital or the prison.
Furthermore, there is no statutory basis for the court's
consideration under subsection (e) the danger posed by Appellant
in the state hospital, particularly if this Court upholds the
statutory language of subsection (b) of section 77-35-21.5, which
22

requires a showing of dangerousness in order for Appellant to
receive treatment.
1. "Treatment" under subsection (e)
As noted above, the basis of the trial court's ruling
that Appellant did not qualify to be sentenced to a treatment
facility was that the only mental illness the trial court thought
statutorily relevant - mental retardation - is permanent and
cannot be cured.
This Court should correct the trial court's unduly
rigid view of "treatment, care, and custody" under subsection (e)
of section 77-35-21.5.

In Matter of Giles, 657 P.2d 285 (Utah

1982), the appellant was involuntarily civilly committed to the
Utah State Hospital after serving a prior commitment resulting
from his having been found not guilty by reason of insanity of
aggravated assault.

In addressing the fifth prerequisite to

civil commitment, this Court referred to and quoted Colyar v.
Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F.Supp. 424 (10th Cir. 1979), in
explaining that "in a given case custody might have to be the
main aspect of the treatment:
The use of the word 'treatment' here should
not be construed to preclude the possibility
of an individual seeking custodial care. Nor
should it be construed as implying that the
state may commit only those for whom there is
currently a proven efficacious treatment. It
is unfortunate, but true, that at the present
time there are many emotional disturbances
that do not lend themselves to treatment and
cure. Therefore, for the purposes of this
decision, the court assumes, without
deciding, that a state may validly recognize
this reality, and, given conformity to other
due process requirements, may involuntarily
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commit an individual for custodial care,
though no known treatment is available. Id.
[Colyar] at 431, Note 5."
Giles at 288-289.

See also State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626

(Utah 1988)(defendant, whose case was remanded for resentencing
under section 77-35-21.5 suffered from "largely irreversible"
chronic brain damage ("mixed organic brain syndrome")).
In this case, while there was no evidence that
Appellant's mental retardation could be reversed by treatment in
the State Hospital, there was evidence that Appellant could
learn, through therapy, to function more successfully.

Dr.

Golding stated that the State Hospital can provide cognitive and
social skills training and psychotherapy for Appellant, as modes
of treating the manifestations of Appellant's mental retardation,
organic personality syndrome, and personality disorders (T. 5156, 71). He concluded that the Utah State Hospital is the
optimal treatment facility for Appellant (T. 80).
The trial court's interpretation of subsection (e) as a
requirement that a mental illness must be completely curable in
order to qualify the patient for sentencing to a therapeutic
facility should be corrected by this Court.
2. Treatment of Appellant's mental illnesses
Dr. Golding explained in detail at trial Appellant's
treatment needs for his mental retardation, organic personality
syndrome, and personality disorders (T. 51-57, attached as
Appendix III). He testified that the optimal location for
Appellant's treatment is the Utah State Hospital (T. 53).
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All of the doctors from the Utah State Hospital
expressed their preference not to treat mentally retarded people
at the Hospital, but admitted that they do treat those mentally
retarded people who have other mental illnesses (T. 96, 100-103)•
The basis of their conclusions that Appellant was not eligible
for treatment at the Utah State Hospital was that they did not
agree with the trial court's and Dr. Golding's finding that
Appellant suffers from several personality disorders (T. 83, 84,
104, 129)* They did testify that the State Hospital is fully
equipped to treat such problems (T. 87, 94, 133-134).

One of the

doctors testified that the appropriate treatment facility for
Appellant was the State Training school (T. 103).
While the doctors from the State Hospital did not feel
that Appellant suffers from personality disorders, the trial
court found that he does (T.2 16, 17, 21). The doctors said that
the personality disorders were treatable at the State Hospital,
but the trial court did not consider the potential for treatment
of Appellant's personality disorders at the State Hospital or
other treatment facility because the court erroneously concluded
that the personality disorders were excluded from the definition
of mental illnesses legally entitled to treatment provided in
section 76-2-305(4). (R. 72).
Because the Utah State Hospital can provide Appellant
with "treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and
appropriate to [his] conditions and needs", the trial court
should have found that Appellant qualifies for treatment under
25

section 77-35-21.5 (e).
3* Subsection (e) allows for sentencing to treatment facilities
other than the State Hospital*
Although Dr. Howell testified that the optimal
treatment facility for Appellant was the State Training School
(T. 103) # the court did not even consider this as a possibility
under the sentencing statute.

During the court's oral ruling,

the court stated,
And No. 5, that the Utah State Hospital is
suitable and good for your treatment. And I
must deal with each one of those if you meet
all five, then this Court would have no
choice but to order your hospitalization at
the Utah State Hospital.
(T.2 16).
Contrary to the trial court's perspective, section 7735-21.5 allows for sentencing to the State Hospital or "other
suitable facility".

The trial court's failure to consider

sentencing Appellant to the State Training School for treatment
of his mental retardation was error.
4. Consideration of Dangers Posed By Appellant in Hospital
Setting
As noted above, part of the trial court's basis in
concluding that Appellant does not qualify for treatment under
subsection (e) is that Appellant is dangerous (R. 73-74).

Given

that subsection (b) of section 77-35-21.5 poses as one of two
alternative prerequisites to treatment a showing that Appellant
poses an immediate physical danger, the trial court should not
have used the danger posed by Appellant as a reason to deny
Appellant treatment.
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Even if subsection (b) is stricken by this Court as
unconstitutional, it is not reasonable to allow the trial court,
acting under subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5, to deny
Appellant treatment in the State Hospital because Appellant is
dangerous.

There is no language in section 77-35-21.5 that

allows for denial of treatment on the basis of the danger posed
by a mentally ill person.

Other statutes governing the State

Hospital require its admission of dangerous patients who are
civilly committed, and its admission of criminal defendants
without regard to the threat that they pose.

See e.g. Utah Code

Ann. sections 64-7-36 (civil commitment); 62A-12-204 (2) and (3)
(State Hospital must accept "any" persons from other institutions
and from the prison after evaluation of the treatment needs of
those persons and the availability of treatment programs to meet
those needs).
CONCLUSION
This Court should vacate Appellant's sentence, correct
the trial court's erroneous views of Utah Code Ann. section 7735-21.5, and remand the case for sentencing in accordance with
proper standards.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDING OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. Cft 88 528 •
RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON,
Hon. Leonard H. Russon
Defendant.
The defendant, Russell M. Anderson, represented by James
Valdez and James Bradshaw, having plead guilty and mentally ill to
two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, both
first
and

degree

having

testimony

felonies, and
received

from

five

their

the

Court

reports,

having
and

appointed

the

Court

alienists

having

(5) mental health professionals

and

heard

two (2)

jailers on June 14, 1988, and the Court having considered several
offered

exhibits

prepared

by

and

Adult

relevant
Probation

portions
and

of

Parole

a presentence
makes

the

report

following

findings:
1.

Section 77-35-21.5(4), Utah Code Annotated mandates

hospitalization for a person pleading guilty and mentally ill if
the defendant

establishes

by clear and convincing

evidence

that

all five sub-parts of Section 77-25-21.5(4) exist.

00LG71

Finding

of Fact

and

Conclusion
Case No. CR 87-528
Page two

2.

With

77-35-21.5(4),

regard

the

Court

to

finds

moderately mentally retarded.
a

mental

defect

as

subsection
that

(a)

the defendant

of

Section

is mildly

to

Further, that mental retardation is

defined

in

Section

76-2-305(4)

and

that

therefore the defendant has a statutory mental illness.
3e
personality

The

Court

disorders

finds

and

that

tends

to

the

defendant

abuse

conditions which do not constitute mental

drugs

has

several

and

alcohol,

illness as defined by

Section 76-2-305(4).
4.
mental

The Court further finds

illness

as defined

in

that the defendant has no

76-2-305(4) other

than

the mental

retardation described in paragraph 2 above.
5.

With

regard

to

subsection

(b)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that, because of his mental illness,
the

defendant

would

not

pose

an

immediate

physical

danger

to

himself or others were he placed into a correctional setting where
he would not have access to drugs or alcohol.
finds

that

the defendant

will

be

able

Further, the Court

to function

State Prison based upon the evidence adduced with

at

the Utah

regard

to the

defendant's prison incarceration in 1981 and 1982 and the present
functioning of the defendant in the Salt Lake County Jail.
6.

With

regard

to

subsection

(c)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the defendant can make rational
decisions regarding the acceptance of mental treatment by weighing

(in* *vrv-:
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the

possible

costs

and

benefits

of

treatment,

even

though

the

defendant is mildly to moderately retarded and has a mental age of
10.

The defendant should not be confused with a 10 year old child

in terms of sophistication,

knowledge

or

innocence, but

instead

has the same ability to learn and perceive as a normal 10 year old
and could follow the direction of a treating psychiatrist without
having

a

complete

understanding

of

the

technical

jargon

and

methodologies used by that psychiatrist.
7.

With

regard

to

subsection

(d)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Prison provides
an

appropriate

treatment

alternative

hospitalization for this defendant.

to

a

court

order

of

That based upon the testimony

of the psychiatrists who work both at the Utah State Prison and
the Utah State Hospital.

Further, that the Utah State Prison has

some programs suited to those of the defendant's needs that can be
addressed by treatment therapies.
8.

With

regard

to

subsection

(e)

of

Section

77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Hospital is not
a

suitable

treatment,
the

facility

for

providing

care and custody

defendant's

conditions

that
and

the

defendant

with

the

is adequate and appropriate to

needs, because

no

therapies

are

available to treat the defendant's problem of retardation which is
permanent.
the

secure

Further, that
custody

the Utah State Hospital cannot provide

necessary

for

the

defendant

who

stands
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convicted

of

two

homicides

in

Salt

Lake

County,

is

awaiting

sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent Second Degree Homicide,
and who tends to abuse drugs and/or alcohol.
9.
establish

In sum, the Court finds the defendant has failed to
by

clear

and

convincing

evidence

that

requirements of Section 77-35-21.5(4) have been met.

all

five

Although the

defendant did establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant
Section

has a mental
77-35-21.5(4),

illness as required
the defendant

not

by subsection

only

did

(a) of

not meet

the

burden required to establish requirements (b) through (e), but the
evidence

of

those

points

was

contrary

to

the

defendant's

contention.
THERFORE, the Court concludes that there is no compulsion
under Section
State

Hospital

77-35-21.5(4) to order hospitalization
or

other

suitable

mental

health

at the Utah
facility

sentencing Russell Miner Anderson in this matter.
DATED

this ^y

daY o£ J u n e

>

1988

-

BY THE COURT:

VNARD

ti. RUSSON,

JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HSNDLEY
'^ CLE6K ..

in

Finding of Fact and

Conclusion
Case No. CR 88-528
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Approved as to form

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Carol Beatie, hereby certify that I delivered Finding
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to James Valdez and James Bradshaw,
Attorneys for the Defendant, Russell Miner Anderson, on the
day of June, 1988.
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APPENDIX 2
DR. GOLDING'S DESCRIPTION OF
APPELLANT'S MENTAL ILLNESSES

faking he would have had all kinds of other things that he
would have been doing at a different level in his life:
vocationally and socially and personally and so forth and

fi

7

So, no, he couldn't be faking in any real sense.

Q

There is nothing in these 20-some-odd IQ tests

| or in these numerous reports that you reviewed that is
j
1 in any way inconsistent with your conclusion that he is,

8
9

so on.

in fact, retarded?
j

10

A

That is correct, there is nothing that is

inconsistent.

11

Q
12

Beyond the retardation, you made certain

conclusions, you drew certain conclusions as to his mental

13

state?

14

A

Yes.

15 I

Q

Could you please tell us what those are?

16 I

A

Well, in brief form, Mr. Anderson has a variety

17 I of personality difficulties which qualify, in my opinion,
18 I as mental disorders which are briefly summarizable as
19 J follows:

He has a great deal of difficulty, partially

20 I flowing from the retardation, in judging social reality
21 I in an appropriate fashion.

He has a great need, again

22 J partially flowing from his retardation, to have other
23 j people basically take care of important social judgments
24

J for him.

25

I extent.

That is, he is dependent on others to a large
He has

—

31

Q

Is there a specific diagnosis?

A

I will come to that in a moment.

j
I prefer to

I

just describe it and then give the kinds of conclusary

J

labels, if you will, at the end.

I

He has a very poorly developed sense of self

I

and self esteem, and is extremely sensitive, as I think

j

would be obvious for a person who has lived with retardation j
for a long time, sensitive to what others think about him

J

to the point where he actually, over the past 15 years,

j

has lived a fairly socially isolated kind of life.
he is very uncomfortable around other people.

That is, j

He experiences!

a great deal of what would be termed "social anxiety."

He

I

is extremely uncomfortable with interpersonal closeness

I

with others.

He doesn't

I

trust what they are going to do or what they think about

J

him.

j

He doesn't trust other people.

And as a consequence of all of this, he has engaged

in a variety of very poor social judgments.
feel very good about himself.

He does not

I

That is a quote by a way

J

of expressing low self-esteem and also a fair statement of

I

chronic low level depression has led to him using and

I

this is not uncommon.

J

He is using a whole variety of

drugs and other forms of medications, most of them illegal,

I

to alter his mood.

J

That is, he uses drugs whether that

be marijuana or LSD or other sorts of things to alter his

I

mood, to make him feel better about himself.

I

And this

I
32

chronic pattern of not getting —

not trusting other

people, feeling very anxious around other people, depending
on other people, being willing to do things for other
people so that they will sort of like him, but not really
wanting to be around most people very much, using drugs
and medications to alter his mood and so forth is a patternthat has existed for a long time.

Since approximately the

8

]

age of 18, from both his report, the reports that were

9

J

available to me, and other indications*

All of that

ties together technically, if you want a technical

10

conclusion*

11

All of that ties together in a diagnostic

12

J summary presented in my report which, in essence, says
u

I that if you want to go by the standard of the American

!5 I Psychiatric Association, as an example, there are other
16 I standards, if you want to go by the standard of the
17 I American Psychiatric Association, you would say of him
18 I that in addition to the retardation, and also some possible
19 I organic disorder caused by an illness at approximately the
20 I age of 18, that he has several personality disorders.
21 J

Q

What are those?

22 I

A

Well, the technical names are "dependent

23 I personality disorder, schizoid personality and antisocial
24 I personality disorder."
25

•

He meets the criteria for all three.

Therefore,

33

APPENDIX 3
DR. GOLDING'S DESCRIPT OF
TREATMENT NEEDS OF APPELLANT

socially appropriate.

All of those kinds of treatments,

J

that is, treatment in individual kind of counseling or

I

psychotherapy, cognitive and social skill training in a

J

structural environment, and substance abuse therapy or

J

other kinds of interventions are commonly available in

J

institutions.

I

Q

Are you familiar with the facilities frequently

available at the Utah State Hospital?

J
I

A

I have some familiarity with that.

I

Q

How about other State Hospitals?

1

A

Because of the nature of my work, I have worked

directly or been a consultant in approximately eight or

I

nine other State Hospitals in Connecticut, North Carolina,
Indiana, British Columbia, all of which are state institutions]
with all of the problems and so forth attendant to state
institutions are pretty much the same.
Q

In your opinion, where would Russell Anderson

receive the most appropriate treatment for the problems
you have described?
A

Well, I characterize the type of institution in

an institution which primarily deals with adults who have
both behavioral problems and significant kinds of mental
disorders.

It is not uncommon for them to also have some

degree of retardation, as does Mr. Anderson, and there
are a variety of such institutions available.

The only

one I know of —
MR. LEMCKE:

I will object to the answer as

unresponsive in terms of the Utah State Hospital.
THE COURT:

I will sustain the objection.

You may restate your question.
Q

(By Mr. Bradshaw)

The question, well, do you

have an opinion as to where the most appropriate —
where Russell Anderson could receive the most appropriate
treatment?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

And what is that?

A

At the Utah State Hospital.

Q

Specifically, what are the conditions and

needs that Russell has in terms of treatment?
A

He needs to be in a closely supervised environment

in which he can receive treatment for his dependency upon
substances to alter his mood.

He needs to be in a

structured environment where he receives cognitive and
social skill training with other adults, so that he can
learn in an appropriate situation how to deal with the
normal stresses of adults dealing with each other, about
ordinary day-to-day events. He needs to be in a structured
situation which has some degree of flexibility so that as
he progresses he can be progressively under less and less
supervision and not have it be kind of, you know, black
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,inci w h i t e k i n d of

thinq

I I It I L

ill I I H I ',"

l i l l I Of t <M

ill

lie n e e d s t o be in an environment
IJ J t t * J I I ' l l !

I 11

lit" n e e d s t o be in a f a c i l i t y
itnilnit" p s y c h o t h e r a p y
i i >>'i|

li'.f • I

and

that

w i l l p r o v i d e him w i t h

l am j u s t

I In1 i Mir i

r e p e a t i n g what I

| u e s l J Mi1.

Q

What is aduJt psychotherapy?

A

What

of counseling

said

is adult psychotherapy'1
i psychotherapy

Midi

It means the kiriril*

que-, un yunllh i H | I I • • I

to a person who has Mr,, Anderson's kinds of adult needs and
his. deqret'j r t impairment with respect hi his personality
I 11 dtji 1 * L I.Ji li J n suspiciousness ot others , to ilea .1 m i th
hits social anxiety around others, to deal, with his
Impression

mull

n 1 i Mi

II I i

basically one on one.

II sometimes happens in qioup counseling,
variety of approaches and theories.

"There are a

That Is the structural

lliswni

Q

In terms of the requirements of Mr, Anderson,

that would have to be a regular onqoinq adult psychotherapy?1
A

for

"i i

II i

some form oi

year
I' Ihi ii"' 11 1

and a h a l f
•

Q

i i III

11II

in I i I

mi nil I L K I J l i e

diiothei
or

I m,

I I mi I

jit l e a s t ,

for

III

ni mi I h u I ii | ,'

probably

coupled with a l l

of

a

the

III h i i 1 1 < i a i •

Win n | mi

t ::: gcii

«y i n I I I I I

un a woekly b a s i s

""treatment,"

d i f f e r e n t d i a g n o s e s you d e s c r i b e d ?
goi :i> g

II i

r iJ"

a r e you t r e a t i n g t h e s e
i s R u s s e l l Anderson

A

I think that he will get better.

You are asking

J

that as sort of a loaded terra in terms of what "better"

I

means exactly.

I

He will reach the point where several

years down the road, assuming all of the other things I

I

just laid out, he would be able to function in a serai-

J

structured environment like a halfway house.

I don't know,

given his past history, whether I would be competent in
predicting much beyond that, whether he would ever be
able to function again solely in the community on his
own.
Q

Let me narrow the question.

A

Less likely.

Q

Will his retardation get better?

A

The fundamental retardation will not get better.

The skills that he has to deal with that retardation can
change.
Q

How about what you have described as organic

personality syndrome, schizoid personality disorder,
schizo-type?
A
too.

Those kinds of disorders similarly can change
To give you an analogy, individuals who have a

serious car accident and receive very serious damage to
the brain, and who have thereafter kind of an explosive
and impulsive pattern of responding to frustration, can
in fact be trained.

It takes several years.

Can be trained
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i 1 I 11 ni I I i' i n t J I, i u- • w 11 | « 111 1II1»a I 11 in | W i l l i
f'hey

wilJ

strike

still

probably

o u t , b u t they

I mi I In i I

I lid I

experience

learn other

1 I ni (Mi

ni 11 mi 11 ni i I s J I i v i 1 y ,

t h e impulses t o

skills

o f howt o deal

i ,'i whit I I in 'din w i n in II ' Vj " ooyiii i II, i n

I ..

social skill training" for persons like Mr, Anderson.
Q

Tha t i s in r eqa rd s t o t he oig a nIc ?

A

A n:! Iliiii •.< social judgment and the retardation,

Q

What about in terms of the schizo-type?

A

The under lyi nq part that; is more relevant is

I lie degree ol tension and anxiety that lie teeJs around
other people.

This is a term of ait, but: to translate it

ni nit n II in1 l.iiiujni up

tii 11 if

ni If imeiins

I •'• that"

w h i U» wc e x p e r i e n c e

interacting with other peuple, some of tlieiiu we like and
some of then we dislike as an ordinary task, of everyday
I

II

I II

II 11 ni I I ni

I11! i n i f i i n n , II I n

11 r e SITM'IK"* 3 o f

iHieir

peoph'1

Iiust 1 lie sheer presence ot other people around him,
induces a rather substantial amount of clinical anxiety,,
i l l I II I mi 111

II i I I I II

Il i l l i ill Ii

T h e i P .I'l i" (

w a v si t I"I I I P 1 p p e o p l e

deal with those kind of anxieties.
Q
A

Q

So, those problems are t^eataJDle?
Vi"i.

Your diagnosis of Mr, Anderson,,, there i s with i n

it, I note that you used DSM categories of disorders,
llihivi! nil i
A

III|HOSHI1

n'H'iri a t in p»»r soma I ill

1 ou

hsoiciers?

Yes.

"";,.6

Q

And an organic problem which is not a personality

disorder s Organic personality syndrome?
A

Correct•

Q

And beyond that retardation?

A

Correct.

Q

The defect, the mental defect of which you spoke

7 j earlier is based on one or all or —
A
You want to translate the DSM3R categories into
I

J

9

I that language of mental disease or defect.

The personality

disorders are diseases, and so is the probable organic
personality disorder.

The mental retardation is a defect.

He needs both sides of that "or" clause, in other w o r d s .

5 |

Q

You prepared an addendum to your initial report?

A

Yes.
MR. L E M C K E :

Your Honor, I don't believe that

6 requires admission as an exhibit. The Court should receive
17 I that simply as one of the reports of the alienists that it
8 I called for coming in.
t9 J

MR* BRADSHAW:

We would ask the Court to consider

20 I it and move for its admisison.
21 I

MR. L E M C K E :

22

THE COURT:

23 I

MR. BRADSHAW:

24 I

THE C O U R T :

25

We have no objection to that.
Well, it is received.
That is all I have.

Thank you.

M r . Bradshaw, before you finish, let

I me have counsel back to the bench just a moment.
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